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I 
In the Supreme Court 
of the State of lJ tab. 
H. L. & IRENE LEACH, dba RUSCO 
WINDOW COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BOARD OF REVIEW, of the INDUS-
TRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOY-
MENT SECURITY, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 7751 
DEPENDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On February 26, 1951, a representative of the Utah De-
partment of Employment Security, acting under the provisions 
of Chapter 42-2a, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, and regulations 
pursuant thereto issued a determination that certain commission 
salesmen (franchise dealers) and certain installation con-
tractors and carpenters were deemed to be in employment 
for the Rusco Window Company, a partnership. 
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On May 7, 1951, a representative of the Department 
issued a review decision affirming the decision of February 26. 
The matter was appealed to the Appeals R~feree on May 14, 
1951. A hearing on the matter was held by the Referee on 
June 25, 1951, and a written decision was rendered under the 
date of July 9, 1951. The Referee upheld the decision of the 
Department representative, and on July 18 the company ap-
pealed to the Board of Review of the Industrial Commission. 
The Board of Review, on August 27, 1951, upheld the decision 
of the Referee, and the matter is now before this court on a 
Petition for Review. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
H. L. & Irene Leach, doing business as Rusco Window 
Company, became subject to the Utah Employment Security 
Act as of July 1, 1948, when it commenced business operations 
in Salt Lake City. Its. business operations consist primarily in 
fabricating, distributing, and installing steel windows specifi-
cally designated as Rusco Windows. 
In its reports to the Department of Employment Security 
the company did not include or pay contributions on the earn-
ings of franchise dealers and installation contractors. It is 
the services and wages of these two groups of workers which 
forms the subject matter for this appeal. 
1. Franchise Dealers 
Written contracts (Tr. 45) generally outline the condi-
tions under which the franchise dealers or salesmen operate. 
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The dealer is given the exclusive right to sell in a certain area 
subject to the limitation that other dealers may enter the area 
to make sales to customers of such dealers. 
Under the written agreement the Rusco Window Com-
pany supplies the goods which are sold to customers. The 
distributor, or the Rusco Window Company, sets these prices 
and fixes the installation schedules and costs (Tr. 45 and 28). 
The dealer is required to verify his selling prices with the 
company. The company supplies all contract forms, and sales 
contracts made by the dealer become binding on the company 
only when accepted by the company (Tr. 24 and 45.) At no 
time does any title to the merchandise pass to the dealer. The 
agreement provides that the dealer must submit all contracts 
to the company for acceptance or rejection within five days 
after the date of sale. The conrtacts may not be assigned by 
the dealer to anyone other than the company, and the contract 
may be cancelled on 5-days' notice. 
The dealer is bound by the contract not to handle, sell, 
or distribute any products other than those provided by the 
company while the contract is in effect. The dealer receives 
his remuneration by way of commission on the contracts which 
he has sold, said commissions becoming payable after the 
materials have been installed. 
The dealers are trained by factory or company represen-
tatives ( T r. 13, 14 and 22) , and during the training period 
the company has classed them as employees and has paid con-
tributions on their earnings (Tr. 13 and 14). For at least a 
period of time when a new dealer commences operations the 
sales manager of the company, who is a salaried representative, 
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accompanies the men on selling activities (Tr. 27). The sales 
manager receives, in addition to his guaranteed salary, a com-
mission based on any sales which might be made jointly by him 
and the dealer during this training period. 
The dealers develop some of their own prospects, and in 
addition they are aided by leads which are furnished by the 
company (Tr. 29). The company does not telephone the leads 
to the dealer, but places them in the dealer's individual mail 
box at the company office where the dealer "religiously" 
picks them up. 
The dealers' activities appear to be those normally asso-
ciated with those of a commission salesman except that in ad-
dition to making the sale, the dealer must complete certain 
company forms which provide information which is necessary 
for F.H.A. or other forms of financing of the purchase (Tr. 
32). Upon making a sale, the dealer delivers the completed 
contract forms to the company. The company then either accepts 
or rejects the contract and takes those steps necessary either 
to get cash settlement for the materials furnished or to help 
the customer arrange financing. 
While there is no evidence to show the dealer has any-
thing further to do with the installation of the materials sold, 
it appears from the testimony (Tr. 30) that the dealers some-
times appear at the customer's place during the installation 
to determine whether or not the customer is satisfied with the 
job. In cases where the customer is not happy, the dealer tells 
the installer "to make the people happy." 
The dealers, insofar as the facts appear, are not list~d 
in the classified section of the telephone directory (Tr. 27). 
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The testimony indicates that the dealers customarily use the 
company's office phone as a reference in their selling activities, 
and the company provides a table at its offices which is re-
served for the use of the dealers (Tr. 19). However, they do 
pay their own expenses (Tr. 14), and their earnings are re-
ceived solely by means of commissions on sales. 
All sales tax licenses are in the name of the Rusco Window 
Company (Tr. 19). The orders which are taken by the sales-
man become binding contracts between the customer and the 
company when they are accepted by the company (Tr. 18). 
All credit investigation is done by the company (Tr. 19). 
The company has certain sales and installation quotas to 
meet. These quotas make -it necessary that the company termi-
nate the services of dealers who are not producing in an amount 
which will permit these quotas to be met. 
The company occasionally makes advances on commis-
sions prior to the time commissions are earned (Tr. 33); how-
ever, this is optional with the company. 
If a dealership is cancelled the dealer must. perforce go 
find another job (Tr. 29). 
2. Installers 
The installation contracts (Tr. 46) provide that the 
installer shall furnish the tools, equipment, and transportation 
necessary to install materials sold by the dealer and to perform 
the service necessary to install such material. The contract with 
the installers is, of course, between the installer and the com-
. 7 
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pany. The contract provides that all installations must be made 
1n workmanlike manner. 
Under the terms of the agreement the installer must com-
plete and obtain a completion certificate on the installation, 
and pe receives his payment for his services when the installa-
tion has been completed. The company formulates and keeps 
available a schedule of installation prices. The contract pro-
vides for cancellation on 5 days' notice. 
In practice the installers are obtained by means which 
include advertising and orders at the employment service 
offices, and they consist primarily of individuals who either 
had or have at the time of their performance other part-time 
or full-time employment either on a salary or pay day basis 
(Tr. 36). For example, two of the installers were employees 
of the Kennecott Copper Company,. one a boiler maker and 
the other a carpenter. 
When the installers appear at the company offices in the 
first instance they are given training in making installations 
and they are familiarized with. the products which they are 
to install. The work which they are required to do includes 
the installation of porch enclosures and the taking out of old 
windows and the putting in of new steel windows~ 
In practice, then, the installer, after he has entered into 
an agreement with the company, appears at the company prem-
ises and picks up for delivery to the customer's property the 
materials which have been fabricated by· the company or which 
have been received in a fabricated state (Tr. 34). He signs a 
receipt for these materials and obtains a list of specifications 
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on installation (these specifications on standard jobs involve 
20 different points). He then transports this material to the 
customer's premises in his, the installer's truck (except that 
when no contract installer is available, the company has the 
materials installed by its own salaried employees and has them 
delivered by its own service truck) (Tr. 34}. 
After the materials have been installed pursuant to the 
detailed specifications (Tr. 35), the installer returns a com-
pletion form to the company and verifies that the materials 
have been installed. The work of the installer is not always 
inspected by the company, but as a matter of practice some-
times the company does inspect it and sometimes the franchise 
dealer inspects the work and contacts the customer to make 
sure the customer is "happy." 
The company attempts to maintain a practice of paying 
fo~ installations on Saturdays, but as a matter of fact,~ the in-
stallers usually collect the amount due for their services at the 
time they turn in the completion form (Tr. 35). 
Whenever it appears that the installer is going to need 
materials which are not included with those which he picks 
up at the company premises, the company advances the money 
to be used in the purchase of these additional materials (Tr. 
35). In cases of out-of-town installations where the installer 
furnishes materials in addition to his labor, his labor costs 
and material costs are itemized separately an.d paid for on that 
basis (Tr. 3·6). 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I. THE FRANCHISE DEALERS PERFORMED PER-
SONAL SERVICES FOR THE RUSCO WINDOW COM-
PANY FOR WAGES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE 
UTAH EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT. 
II. THE SERVICES WERE NOT EXCLUDED BY THE 
EXCLUSION PROVISIONS OF SECTION 19(j) (5) (A) 
(B) & (C). 
III. THE CONTRACT INSTALLERS WERE PERFORM-
ING PERSONAL SERVICES FOR THE RUSCO WINDOW 
COMPANY FOR WAGES WITHIN THE MEANNG OF 
THE UTAH EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT. 
IV. THE SERVICES OF THE CONTRACT INSTALL-
ERS WERE NOT EXCLUDED BY REASON OF THE EX-
CLUSION PROVISIONS OF SECTION 19(j) (5) (A) (B) 
& (C). 
ARGUMENT 
Before discussing specific points of argument we would 
like to briefly refer to the findings in earlier decisions of this 
court on unemployment compensation. The provisions of the 
Utah Employment Security Act, Chapter 42-2a for determin-
ing whether individuals are performing services in "employ-
ment" have been so clearly interpreted by this court in previous 
unemployment compensation cases that it is not necessary to 
look to other fields or decisions for precedents. (See Globe 
Grain & Milling Company vs. Industrial Commission and 
10 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Albert Thomas, 98 U. 36, 91 P. 2d 512; Creameries of America 
vs. Industrial Commission and Robert L. Foss, 98 U. 577, 102 
P. 2d 300; Salt Lake Tribune Publishing Company vs. Indus-
trial Commission and Lynn Clark Cushing, 99 U. 259, 102 
P. 2d 307; The Fuller Brush Company vs. Industrial Commis-
sion and Lamont Holst, 99 U. 97, 104 P. 2d 201; Singer Sew-
ing Machine Company vs. Industrial Commission and Gor-
man C. Winget, 104 U. 175, 134 P. 2d 479; B. Grant Powell, 
also known as B. G. Powell, dba, Royal Blaze Coal Company 
vs. Industrial Commission, 210 P. 2d 1006). 
Therefore, we must first determine whether or not there 
is a performance of personal service for the employing unit 
for wages within the meaning of Section 42-2a-19(j) (1), 
which provides as follows: 
" 'Employment' means any service performed prior 
to January 1, 1941, which was employment as defined 
in the Utah Unemployment Compensation Law prior to 
the effective date of this act, and subject to the other 
provisions of this subsection, service performed after 
December 31, 1940, including service in interstate 
commerce, and service as an officer of a corporation 
performed for wages or under any contract of hire 
written or oral, express or implied.'' 
Section 42-2a-19(p) defines wages: 
" ' Wages' means all remuneration for personal 
services, including commissions and bonuses and the 
cash value of all remuneration in any medium other 
than cash. Gratituties customarily received by an indi-
vidual in the course of his employment from persons 
other than his employing unit shall be treated as wages 
received from his employing unit. The reasonable cash 
11' 
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value of remuneration in any medium other than cash 
and the reasonable amount of gratuities shall be esti- J 
mated and determined in accordance with rules pre-
scribed by the Commission; provided, that the term 
'wages' shall not include: ... " 
Accordingly, if it is found that the services of the indi-
viduals in question are performed for the employing unit for 
wages, then the services are within the purview of the Employ-
ment Security Act unless they are excluded by the statutory 
tests of Section 42-2a-19(j) (5) (A) (B) & (C), which are 
as follows: 
" ( 5) Services performed by an individual for wages 
or under any contract of hire, written or oral, express 
or implied, shall be deemed to be employment subject 
to this act unless and until it is shown to the satisfac-
tion of the Commission that-
.' (A) such individual has been and will continue 
to· be free from control or direction over the perform-
ance of such services, both under his contract of hire 
and in fact; and 
'' (B) such service is either outside the usual course 
of the business for which such service is performed 
or that such service is performed outside of all the 
places of business of the enterprise for which such 
service is performed; and 
" (C) such individual is customarily engaged in an 
independently established trade, occupation, profes-
sion, or business of the same nature as that involved 
in the contract of service." 
In the Creameries of America and the Salt Lake Tribune 
cases, supra, the following elements were pointed out as 
12 
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evidence in the relationship of employment: (a) The pur-
chasers were customers of the company, not the distributor; 
(b) the company never relinquished its right to these custo-
mers; (c) the distributor had to furnish the company a list 
of the new customers; (d) the dealer could acquire no custo-
mers for himself; (e) the company paid him $1 for each new 
customer he obtained; (f) the retail sales price was fixed by 
the company; (g) the goodwill of the public was reserved to 
the company; (h) the dealer could handle no products other 
than those of the company; (i) upon termination of contract 
he could not deal with customers relative to products for such 
lines for two years after. 
In the Singer Sewing Machine case, supra, the following 
elements reveal that the service relationship existed: (a) The 
contract between the company and the salesman provided that 
the salesman was authorized to solicit, negotiate, and effect 
the prices and on terms approved and authorized from time 
to time by the company, sales and leases of Singer Sewing 
Machines; (b) the title to the machines remained in the Com-
pany; (c) he was authorized to collect on such company ac-
counts as were leased or placed in his hands; (d) the leases 
and sales on time were to be made in the name of the com-
pany and the papers turned over to it; (e) the salesman made 
weekly reports of all business done and daily remitted monies 
collected; (f) the company reserved the right to reject any 
sale or lease made by the salesman. 
The court stated: 
"Each of the above terms are inconsistent with the 
concept of vendor-vendee relationship. The business 
13 
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shows it was the company's goods, the company's ac-
counts; the company's risks of profit or loss; the com-
pany's money; the company's customers; the company's 
goodwill; the company's salesman. Many of the serv-
ices rendered by the salesman were rendered at the 
specific direction of and for the company. It was a 
service relationship.'' 
In the Singer Sewing Machine Company case the court 
quoted parts of its decision in the Fuller Brush Company case, 
supra, supplying in brackets explanation of the court's inten-
tion in the Fuller case. We quote from the Singer case: 
" · The question as to whetherone performing per-
sonal services is performing them for another or for 
himself usually offers no difficulty. In a few border-
line cases, where services for another and for self may 
overlap, or where an artificial relationship may be 
set up between the parties, some difficulty may be en-
countered. It may be stated that [beyond any ques-
tion) services are performed for another when per-
formed under his supervision, direction and control; 
in the performance of the details of the work and in 
the use of the means employed; (Texas Co. v. Whee-
less, 185 Miss. 799, 187, So. 880) [or) when he has 
the right to hire (select the worker) and the right 
to fire (terminate the employment) and when the 
compensation, if any, accruing to the worker becomes 
a direct liability on the other party. But all these are 
not always present, [is not this an equivalent of a 
statement that he may be in "employment" without, 
"control" or without "the right to hire and fire" or 
without compensation "being a direct liability" on 
the other party) and if present they may not be evi-
dent on a casual examination. Under- some of the recent 
labor legislation, the right to hire and fire has been 
much limited. The right to determine and fix the com-
14 
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'S: 
pensation of the worker is indicative, although under 
many wage laws the compensation is fixed by law 
or by an administrative body, or may be determined 
by a contract between the employer and a third party.'" 
(See also the B. Grant Powell case, supra.) 
I. THE FRANCHISE DEALERS PERFORMED PER-
SONAL SERVICES FOR THE RUSCO WINDOW COM-
·PANY FOR WAGES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE 
UTAH EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT. 
In the instant case the record reveals that the company 
was engaged in fabricating, distributing and installing steel 
windows. To carry out the selling part of its business, the 
company entered into contracts with franchise dealers or sales-
men to sell its products to cust?mers. The company fixed the 
prices and the installation schedules and ,costs. The dealer was 
required to verify his selling prices with the company. The 
company supplied all contract forms, and the sales contracts 
negotiated by the dealer became binding on the company only 
when accepted by the company. The company retained title 
to all merchandise, and the dealers were required to submit 
all contracts to the company for acceptance or rejection within 
five days after the date of sale. The contracts were not assign-
able by the dealer, and the dealer's contract could be cancelled 
on five days' notice. The dealer was bound by contract not 
to sell or distribute any products other than those provided 
by the company while the contract was in effect. 
The dealer received his remuneration by means of com-
missions on merchandise which he sold, said commissions being 
15 
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payable after the materials had been installed. The dealers 
were trained by factory or company representatives and during 
the training period were classified as employees. In many cases 
a new dealer when commencing operations, was accompanied 
by the sales manager of the company who was a salaried rep-
resentative. This sales manager received, in addition to his 
guaranteed salary, a commission based on any sales which might 
be made jointly by him and the dealer during this training 
period. 
The dealers were furnished leads by the company, said 
leads being picked up at the office of the company from each 
dealer's individual mail box. The dealer was required to com-
plete certain company forms which were necessary in securing 
F.H.A. or other forms of financing. The dealers customarily 
used the company's office phone as a reference in their selling 
activities, and a table in the office of the company was re-
served for the use of the dealers. 
All sales tax licenses were in the name of the Rusco Win-
dow Company. All credit investigation was done by the com-
pany . 
. The company had certain sales and installation quotas 
to meet, and these quotas make it necessary that the company 
terminate the services of dealers who were not producing an 
amount which would permit these quotas to be met. The 
company had the right to hire and the right to fire the worker, 
and the compensation of the dealer became a direct liability 
on the company at the time installations were made. 
The agreement between the company and the franchise 
dealer provides specifically for the sale of products of the 
16 
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distributor, which in this case is the company. That the fran-
chise dealer was receiving his remuneration by means of a 
commission rather than by means of any sale of contracts is 
obvious from the following language of the agreement between 
the company and the franchise dealer; 
"14. This franchise dealer shall be entitled to a com-
mission on any contract secured by him from customer 
after said contract has been approved by the distributor 
(the company) and after the products ordered by the 
customer have been installed and invoiced and the 
commission to be fixed by and in accordance with 
a discount or commission schedule maintained by the 
distributor at its office in Salt Lake City, Utah. The 
distributor agrees on written request to provide in 
writing to the franchise dealer the amount of commis-
sion called for on any particular contract or order 
secured by this franchise dealer." 
The provisions of the franchise dealer agreement are in-
consistent with the concept of a vendor-vendee relationship. 
As in the Singer case, supra, the record shows that it was the 
company's goods, the company's accounts, the company's risks 
of profit and loss, the company's money, the company's custo-
mers, the company's goodwill, and the company's salesmen. 
The services were performed for wages as defined in Section 
42-2a-19 (p), being entirely in the form of commissions on 
sales. Clearly, there existed between the company and the 
franchise dealer a service relationship which brought the· 
services of the franchise dealers within the term "employment" 
as defined by the Act. The determination by the Commission 
that a service relationship existed is fully supported by the facts. 
17 
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II. THE SERVICES WERE NOT EXCLUDED BY THE 
EXCLUSION PROVISIONS OF SECTION 19(j) (5) (A) 
(B) & (C). 
Having found that a service relationship existed between 
the franchise dealers and the company thus bringing the serv-
ices within the purview of the Employment Security Act, we 
now examine the record to determine whether or not these 
services are excluded by the provisions of 19 (j) ( 5) (A) (B) 
& (C) supra. It will be noted that the exclusion provisions of 
that section are in the conjunctive, and in order to support an 
exclusion the company must satisfy each provision. 
Considering these three tests in the order in which they 
appear in the statute, we find: 
(A) (Control Test). The Commission correctly found 
that although there was a great deal of freedom exercised by 
the dealers in carrying out their selling activities, they were 
certainly not entirely free of company control. It will be re-
membered that these individuals were, in the first instance, 
given some training. They were required to complete com-
pany forms and submit in detail the information required 
by the company. The times at which these forms and infor-
mation was to be submitted were specified either by the com-
pany indirectly or by means of the contractual terms. 
The testimony was that the company had quotas to meet 
and unless the franchise dealers did their part in the selling 
scheme, the company would have to fire the dealer and get 
someone who could more effectively carry out the business of 
selling. 
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In its application the statute contemplates that the Com-
mission must look not only to the controls which were exercised 
in actual practice by the company, but to the right to control 
which is inherent in the particular relationships between the 
company and the dealers as evidenced by the facts. It will be 
noted in paragraph II of the dealer's contract that the dealer 
must "operate in accordance with policies established by the 
distributor." (company). Paragraph X of the contract provides 
that the agreement may be cancelled on five days' written 
notice. 
The right to hire and the right to fire is always indicative 
of the right to control particularly when the activities. of the 
worker are "dovetailed" into the general company operations. 
The dealer was, of course, in every instance controlled as to 
specifications and price. The Commission properly found, 
therefore, that the (A) test was not satisfied inasmuch as there 
was no showing that the individual was completely free of 
control within the meaning of . the statute. 
(B) (Usual Course and Place of Business Test). From 
the records and the facts, it appears without question that the 
usual course of the company's business is that of assembling, 
fabricating, selling, and installing steel windows, designated 
as Rusco Windows. It will be noted that from time to time 
during the period in question the company engaged a salaried 
individual to act as sales manager. When there was no particular 
designation of anyone specifically as a sales manager, some 
other member. of the organization acted in that capacity. 
While the main portion of the services of the individuals 
in question were performed outside all places of business of 
19 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the company, certainly not all of the services were performed 
outside the company's business establishment. The company 
maintained at its offices a table for the use of the salesmen or 
dealers. It maintained mail boxes in which leads and business 
calls were placed. The salesmen, as a general practice, re-
ligiously appeared at the offices of the company to pick up 
their mail and to take care of phone calls. It was the practice 
·of the individual franchise dealers generally to use the tele-
phone number of the company as reference. This would nat-
urally result in the requirement that a certain portion of time 
be spent in taking care of these calls which arrived at the com-
pany's offices pursuant to this reference. 
The Commission properly found that although the work 
was mainly performed outside the places of business of the 
company a certain proportion of the work was actually per-
formed on the company's premises. 
(C) (Independently Established) . An examination of 
the records and the testimony shows that while the individuals 
in question were termed franchise dealers, there is little, if 
anything, to. distinguish them from commission salesmen who 
are hired on a contract basis to sell at specified rates of com-
mission. 
The dealers paid nothing for the dealerships. In the 
course of their activities they acquired no property right. They 
were required to put forth no capital outlay. (The only 
amounts they invested were for expenses). They acquired 
nothing which they could subsequently sell or convey to an-
other. The risk of profit and loss was all in the company, and 
when their services were terminated by the company, they 
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~I :rq 
became unemployed in the same sense that any other workman 
who had been engaged either on a salary or commission be-
comes unemployed. If his dealership agreement was termi-
nated, the franchise dealer could, of course, go to some similar 
industry and convince another employing unit that his services 
were valuable and should be engaged. At no time did he 
acquire for himself anything other than training and experi-
ence together with his commissions. His activities were 
thoroughly integrated with the other acitvities of the com-
pany. They consisted entirely of carrying out an agency re-
lationship for a certain commission based on the volume of 
sales made by the dealer and accepted and installed by the 
company. He was prevented by his contract from selling other 
products while the franchise agreement was in effect. He had, 
therefore, no independence from the company in carrying out 
his assigned activities. 
The Commission correctly found that the franchise dealers 
were not customarily engaged in an independently established 
business of the same nature as that involved in their contract 
of service. 
III. THE CONTRACT INSTALLERS WERE PERFORM-
ING PERSONAL SERVICES FOR THE RUSCO WINDOW 
COMPANY FOR WAGES WITHIN THE MEANNG OF 
THE UTAH EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT. 
When a sale has been made by the franchise dealer and 
the financing has been arranged by the company, an installa-
tion specification sheet is turned over to an individual designated 
as an installation contractor. In the first instance, the company 
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obtains the services of this contract installer by advertising 
in the papers and by placing orders with the employment 
service offices in the state. 
Primarily, these installers either had, at the time they 
were engaged by the company, part-time or full-time work on 
a salaried or day paid basis or they had such other employment 
during the time they were doing the installing. For example, 
the record reveals that two of the installers, one a boiler maker 
and the other a carpenter, were currently employed by the 
Kennecott Copper Company. 
The installers are required to furnish the necessary tools 
and equipment, and in most cases to transport the needed 
material to the place of installation, that is, the customer's 
premises. In practice the installer is called by telephone and 
notified that there is an installation to be made. He then 
appears at the company premises and picks up the materials 
which are fabricated and assembled. He then transports them 
to the place of installation and installs them according to the 
specification sheet which is given him at the time he takes the 
work. Whenever it appears that the installer will need materials 
in addition to those which he picks up at the company premises, 
the company advances the money to be used in the purchase 
of these materials. After the work is completed the installer 
returns a completion form to the company and verifies that 
the materials have been installed. 
At no ~me in the process does the installer have any title 
in the materials which are being installed. His only compen-
sation for the work is that which he received from the com-
pany. This compensation is arrived at by the company from a 
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schedule of installation prices, which is formulated and main-
tained by the company. 
The installer's work is not always inspected by the com-
pany, but as a matter of practice the company does. sometimes 
inspect it to make sure the customer is satisfied. Under the 
working arrangement it is agreed that the company may termi-
nate the installer's services at any time on 5 days' notice. 
It would appear that there is little to distinguish these 
installers from the ordinary carpenter who owns. his own tools 
and customarily uses them as a part of his occupation. The 
company does not maintain a foreman on each job, but there 
is definitely a great amount of control exercised by the com-
pany in that the individual is required to do his work according 
to the detailed specifications of the company. If installations 
are not made in accordance with the instructions given by the 
company at the time of the original training of the installer, 
then, of course, he is subject to being fired. 
The Commission correctly found that the contract installers 
were performing services for wages for the company. The 
measure of wages earned by the installer is, of course,. the 
difference between the installation schedule price (in other 
words, the piece rate price) and the expenses which might have 
been incurred by the installer in transporting the materials to 
the job. It must be noted that in some instances the company 
uses its own transportation and its own salaried people to make 
installations if there are no so-called contract installers im-
mediately available. It also must be noted that in cases of 
out-of-town installations where the installer furnishes mater-
ials in addition to his labor he is required to itemize 
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separately his labor costs and his material costs as a basis 
for payment by the company. The relationship is clearly a 
service relationship. 
IV. THE SERVICES OF THE CONTRACT INSTALL-
ERS WERE NOT EXCLUDED BY REASON OF THE EX-
CLUSION PROVISIONS OF SECTION 19(j) (5) (A) (B) 
& (C). 
These contract installers are not excluded from coverage 
under the Employment Security Act by reason of the exclusion 
tests of Section 19 (j) ( 5). 
The company, by reason of the original training of these 
individuals and the detailed specification sheets and job com-
pletion requirements, does maintain a definite control over the 
installers. The company could and would terminate the serv-
ices of any installer if such services were detrimental to the 
customer's satisfaction. If the work is not done at the time and 
in a manner which meets with the approval of the company, the 
company would, of course, terminate the services. 
While the work is done in the usual course of the com-
pany's business, there is. only a minimum of service performed 
at the premises of the company. This service consists generally 
in picking up the materials which are to be installed. This is 
true, of course, unless it is considered that during the installa-
tion ·the situs of the installation is a place of business of the 
company. 
There is no indication that these contract installers are 
customarily engaged in an independently established trade, oc-
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cupation, profession, or business of the same nature as that 
involved in their contract of service. As was previously pointed 
out, these contract installers are usually engaged by the com-
pany by means of advertising and through orders placed with 
the employment service. They are individuals who customarily 
have the type of an occupation under which they perform 
service for others for wages. They have no established business 
as that term is generally known. They are performing only one 
step in the general business operations of the company and 
are doing so subject to the company desires. At any time their 
services might be terminated, and they would be unemployed 
just as any other unemployed individual who usually works 
for day wages or salary. 
At no time do they have title to the materials which are 
being used. The customers are the company's customers; it is 
the company's goodwill; the company's property; the com-
-• pany' s business. 
There is no evidence that these installers hold themselves 
out to the public generally as being engaged in that type of 
business. Some of them did this, of course, only during periods 
of time when their employer's operations (as in the case of 
the Kennecott Copper Company employees) were closed and 
work in their regular job was not available. Whether or not 
the installers had installation work to do depended entirely 
on whether or not the company salesmen (franchise dealers) 
made sufficient sales in order to make jobs available. It also 
depended on whether or not the company notified them by 
telephone or otherwise that there was work to be done. 
While there may have been some negotiation from time 
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to time regarding the amount they were to receive for their 
work, the general rule was that they receive for such work the 
wages which were fixed by the company schedules. There was 
no open bidding for these jobs as would be customary if they 
were being done by individuals or companies customarily en-
gaged in doing that type of work. Just as the franchise dealers 
did not have business addresses and did not advertise for busi-
ness, neither did the contract installers have business locations 
nor did they advertise as would normally be expected of indi-
viduals who offered their services to the public at large. 
The Commission correctly found that the services of the 
contract installers were not excluded by the provisions of Sec-
tion 19 (j) ( 5), supra. 
CONCLUSION 
We submit that the franchise dealers and the contract 
installers are squarely within the purview of the Utah Em-
ployment Security Act as interpreted by previous decisions of 
this court and, therefore, were performing services in em-
ployment within the meaning of the Act. The defendants, 
therefore, pray that the findings of the said defendants that 
the franchise dealers and the contract installers were perform-
ing services in employment as defined by the Act be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS: 
CLINTON D. VERNON, 
Attorney General 
FRED F. DREMANN, Special 
Assistant Attorney General 
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